Hope grows.

As the tentacles power grew in Egypt and strangled citizens, they found their strength to struggle against this force, at first nibbling, then gnawing - rapidly becoming more assertive. I have watched this scene unfold and remain transfixed on whether or not they will be able to truly oust the beast.

The police have been dealt their karmic cards - stations burned, authority stripped.

The military remains the wildcard. Whether or not the military will support the people or the government will help shape the outcome.

The president is deposing the government as he plans to be the lone horse riding into town at dawn after this long, long night. Brave or stupid? Either way, his karmic card will be dealt.

Part Four - Politics, People and Prayer: Behind the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan

Implications for the Nation

Sherry Rehman has recognized that support for the blasphemy law is a symptom of the increasing extremism in Pakistan that has led to increasing disregard for human rights: “Even with full repeal, the abuse of minorities won’t stop. Most cases are perpetrated by mobs.”

She goes on to say, “They, too, must know the law will take cognizance of their behaviour as criminal and liable for punishment.” However, authorities have turned a blind eye to the mobs, perhaps out of fear, ideology or lack of capacity. The weakness of the judiciary is exposed as the public enforces the blasphemy law rather than the courts.

The implications of this are far-reaching. Democracy in Pakistan is weak to say the least – Pakistanis may be able to vote, but stale political choices and lack of protection for minority rights reveal the regressive nature of the political system.

The deep political divide, however, is not as clear as it may first appear. Those who oppose the blasphemy law face a muzzle on their freedom of speech – the price of removing the muzzle proved too high for Mr. Taseer.

The true failure of the nation lies in the irony of a country created to protect a population from becoming a sidelined minority to later rearing its ugly head as a mob majority.

Part Three - Politics, People and Prayer: Behind the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan

Real Politik

Pakistan has not been afforded the luxury of a stable political system. Between the military dictatorships of ul Haq in 1988 and Musharraf in 1999, the pendulum of power has swung between governments led by Benazir Bhutto as leader of the Pakistani’s People Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif, leader of the Pakistani Muslim League – Nawaz Group (PML-N). Battling constant allegations of corruption, satisfying the electorate and appeasing the religious elements of society has left little time for action on the blasphemy law.

During Bhutto’s second term in office, she was unable to make procedural changes to the law, let alone abolish it. Musharraf was similarly unsuccessful in 2005. After the fall of Musharraf in 2008, and the introduction of another PPP government under Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani and Asif Ali Zardari, Bhutto's widower, the law remains intact.

In November 2010, PPP Member of National Assembly (MNA) and former Information Minister Sherry Rehman brought a private member’s bill to the National Assembly to amend the blasphemy law. The most important amendment Rehman proposed was to replace the death penalty in section 295-C with a 10-year sentence. The government has maintained that the PPP is not associated with the bill and it should be viewed as a private member’s bill.

On January 1^st, a strike in Pakistan’s largest urban centre, the port city of Karachi, was organized in condemnation of the proposed amendments. The city was virtually shut down as businesses and transport operators stopped service to protest the amendments.

In addition to this opposition is the added complication of the support of lawyers, religious leaders, and political parties of the actions of Mumtaz Qadri, Salman Taseer’s killer. Public rallies held in support of Qadri’s cause have put the government further on edge.

The PPP government is already in a minority position, and needs the support of coalition parties in order to effectively lead the country. With the withdrawal of key support from the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) earlier this month, the government cannot afford an unpopular move. Amending the blasphemy law may prove to be political suicide, even if the act itself is in line with the ideology of the party. This paints a bleak picture for those that hope the blasphemy law will be repealed and dark implications for the possibilities of a true democracy in Pakistan.

Part Two - Politics, People and Prayer: Behind the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan

Consequences of the law

Interestingly enough, protective measures for minorities exist within Part XV of the PPC. For instance, sections 295 and 295-A of the PPC speak against offences made against “religions of any class”, unlike later sections that refer specifically to Islamic symbols. Unfortunately, time has proven that sections such as 295B and 295C, which refer to the defilement of the Quran and defamation of the Prophet, have received far more attention by the public and judicial system.

The National Commission for Justice and Peace (NCJP) is a human rights advocacy organization founded in 1985 by the Pakistan Catholic Bishops’ Conference. It has been in strong opposition to the blasphemy law and has advocated on behalf of those wrongfully accused under it since 1990.
According to the NCJP 2009-2010 Human Rights Monitor, there were an increasing number of blasphemy cases in 2008 and 2009, and further research indicated that a number of cases exploited the law for personal reasons. In 2009, the government compensated victims for loss of property and loss of life at the hands of extremists in relation to blasphemy cases, but the government has not identified a long-term strategy to stop the abuse of the legislation.

The NCJP has also reported that 479 Muslims, 340 Qadianis, 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and 10 people who identify with other religions were charged under the blasphemy law from 1986 to 2009. Although Muslims have not been excluded from prosecution under the law, the minorities who have been charged, even if they have escaped conviction, have paid a high price.

In 1993, Rehamat Masih, Manzooh Masih and Salamat Masih (just 11 years old at the time) were accused under the laws for allegedly writing offensive phrases on a wall of a mosque in the province of Punjab. In 1994, Manzoor was shot after one of his court hearings. Salamat Masih and Rehamat Masih were sentenced to death in February of 1995. Later that same month, both were acquitted of charges by the Lahore High Court. Justice Arif Iqbal Hussain Bhatti, who was one of the judges involved in the case, was killed two years later. His killer was later caught and cited the acquittal of Salamat and Rehamat as the motivation behind his brutal act.
Following international attention brought to the blasphemy law in 1995, the government proposed amendments to the law to avoid further abuse. The first proposed amendment was the implementation of a 10-year jail sentence for false blasphemy accusations. The government also proposed a requirement that sufficient evidence must be presented to the satisfaction of a magistrate before a case could be formally registered.

In May 2005, there was a nationwide strike supported by conservative political parties against the changes. This resulted in the government dropping the proposed amendments and the Interior Minister announcing that the mandatory death penalty under section 295-C would remain intact.
Despite the growing division over the law, hundreds of individuals continued to be charged. And although none of these individuals were given the death penalty by the state, the sentence was often carried out extrajudicially.

Samuel Masih, a Christian, was charged with blasphemy in 2003 for allegedly spitting on the wall of a mosque. Masih was accused of defiling a mosque. While in prison, Masih became sick with tuberculosis and was transported to a hospital. A police officer who was designated as Masih's guard, Faryad Ali, killed Masih by striking him with a brick cutter. Ali claimed that it was his duty as a Muslim to kill Masih. Masih was 27 years old at the time of his death.

Others accused of blasphemy, such as Anwat Masih who was charged in 2003 but later acquitted, have been forced to go into hiding to avoid the fate faced by Manzoor Masih and Samuel Masih. Dr. Younas Sheikh was also charged in 2000 and was later acquitted. Sheikh was re-tried in 2003 and was acquitted once more, finally leaving Pakistan for Europe the same year.

The abuse of the law against minorities by those seeking to settle scores, as is suspected in the case of Aasia Bibi, is also of increasing concern. In 2006, two elderly Christian men were tried and then acquitted for allegedly burning pages of the Quran, charges that were conveniently raised during a land ownership dispute.
These are just a few examples of the deep impact this law has had on individuals. The United Nations, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch are just a few organizations that have identified Pakistan’s blasphemy law as hugely problematic for human rights. Given the long history of abuse of the law, its impact on minorities and international outcry, it is unusual that no government after 1990 has taken the opportunity to remedy the issues the blasphemy law has created in Pakistani society.

Part One - Politics, People and Prayer: Behind the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan

Origins of Pakistan’s Blasphemy Law

The sections within Part XV of Pakistan’s Penal Code (PPC), Of Offences Relating to Religion, known as the blasphemy law, have been codified since the inception of the nation. The sections in the PPC have their origin in pre-partition India, where the law applied to every religion with a far less harsh consequence, two years in prison with possibility of bail.

The law was amended under General Zia ul Haq’s government. The amendments were part of the dictator’s broader aim during his tenure from 1977 to 1988 to Islamicize Pakistani society. Additions to PPC under this section criminalized the acts of making derogatory remarks against the Prophet, derogatory remarks against holy passages and defilement of mosques. The most controversial change, however, was not made until after ul Haq’s death.

Since then, section 295-C reads:

Use of derogatory remarks, etc., in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

The punishment of death prescribed in section 295-C distinguishes this particular offence from the rest. This amendment was introduced in 1990 by the Federal Shariat Court (FSC). The FSC was created in 1980 under the guidance of General Zia ul Haq. The organization’s function is to examine legislation to determine whether or not it is consistent with what the FSC considers Islamic law. The creation of the FSC was just one piece of ul Haq’s institutionalization of his personal brand of Islam.

Despite opposition to ul Haq's regime by many groups, including the 11-party coalition, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), ul Haq managed to maintain power for over a decade. MRD included many of Pakistan’s future leaders including Salman Taseer and Benazir Bhutto – who despite obtaining positions of power and publicly opposing the blasphemy law, were unable to change it.

Democracy was restored for just over a decade after ul Haq died mysteriously in 1988, but his legislative legacy remains intact. Ultimately this legacy undermines minorities, encourages extremism and has exposed the deep divides in Pakistani society.

Politics, People and Prayer: Behind the Blasphemy Law in Pakistan

Introduction to a 4-part series.

The recent battle surrounding the blasphemy law in Pakistan has intensified in the wake of Salman Taseer’s assassination. Mumtaz Qadri has confessed to shooting Taseer, the governor of the province of Punjab. Qadri, a member of Taseer’s security detail, confirmed that Taseer’s opposition to the blasphemy law was the motivation for the assassination carried out on January 4.

Since November 2010, a new round of debate has ignited over the blasphemy law in the Pakistani Penal Code (PPC). Early in the month, a Christian woman, Aasia Bibi, was sentenced to death for allegedly contravening the law. Taseer, an advocate for the abolishment of the blasphemy law, was also a supporter of Bibi, who is from the province of Punjab. This is not the first incidence of a public official being murdered as a result of their opposition to the controversial legislation.

In a nation with a population of over 175 million, with 95% self-identifying as Muslim, the threat of the blasphemy law being used against minorities has proven to be great. Even though the majority of cases are brought upon Muslim Pakistanis, the consequences for non-Muslims accused of this crime are often far more severe.

Among increasingly loud cries that Pakistani society is experiencing a resurgence in extreme values and attitudes, the sharp divide between those who advocate for the law and those who rally against it is becoming apparent. This divide is a result of the slow transformation of the intent of blasphemy law – from originally seeking to protect all religions from persecution, to its current use, where it appears to serve a particular (mis)understanding of Islam.